Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting : rules versus discretionary budgets

Dilip Mookherjee and Anusha Nath

Year of publication:	2021
Authors:	Mookherjee, Dilip ; Nath, Anusha
Publisher:	[Boston, MA] : Boston University - Department of Economics
Subject:	clientelism \| governance \| targeting \| budgeting \| Öffentlicher Haushalt \| Public budget \| Regelbindung versus Diskretion \| Rules versus discretion \| Patronage \| Clientelism \| Armutsbekämpfung \| Poverty reduction \| Theorie \| Theory

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