Coalition formation and the ancillary benefits of climate policy
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Finus, Michael ; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G. |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Ancillary Benefits | Climate Policy | Coalition Formation | Game Theory | Impure Public Goods |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 62.2008 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 643904786 [GVK] hdl:10419/53383 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H87 - International Fiscal Issues ; Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters |
Source: |
-
Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy
Finus, Michael, (2008)
-
Public good provision and ancillary benefits : the case of climate agreements
Finus, Michael, (2013)
-
Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements
Finus, Michael, (2013)
- More ...
-
Coalition formation and the ancillary benefits of climate policy
Finus, Michael, (2008)
-
Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy
Finus, Michael, (2013)
-
Public good provision and ancillary benefits : the case of climate agreements
Finus, Michael, (2013)
- More ...