Coalition formation in a global warming game : how design of protocols affects the sucess of environmental treaty-making
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Eyckmans, Johan ; Finus, Michael |
Published in: |
Natural resource modeling : the official journal of the Resource Modeling Association. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0890-8575, ZDB-ID 61398-8. - Vol. 19.2006, 3, p. 323-358
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Subject: | CLIMNEG | Klimaschutz | Climate protection | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Koalition | Coalition | Theorie | Theory | Welt | World | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | CGE-Modell | CGE model |
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