Coalition structure values in differential information economies:is unity a strength?
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Krasa, Stefan ; Temimi, Akram ; Yannelis, Nicholas C. |
Published in: |
Differential information economies. - Berlin [u.a.] : Springer, ISBN 3-540-21424-0. - 2005, p. 553-565
|
Subject: | Koalition | Coalition | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Shapley-Wert | Shapley value | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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