Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences : an application of the minimax theorem
Year of publication: |
August 2016
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Authors: | Yamamura, Hirofumi |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 65.2016, p. 48-57
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Subject: | Single-dippedness | Strong Nash equilibrium | Minimax theorem | Core solution | Strong Nash implementation | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Core | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Koalition | Coalition |
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