Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Klaus, Bettina |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 34.2001, 1, p. 64-82
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Subject: | Allokation | Allocation | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Koalition | Coalition | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Diktatur | Dictatorship | Theorie | Theory |
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