Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. Any small unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Ray, Indrajit ; Gupta, Sonali
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 42.2013, 2, p. 541-562
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Duopoly \| Coarse correlation \| Simple devices \| Sunspots

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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