Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
Year of publication: |
July 2017
|
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Authors: | Troyan, Peter |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 170.2017, p. 319-345
|
Subject: | Collusion | Second-price | Auction | Interdependent values | Signaling | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Signalling | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kartell | Cartel |
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