Collusion in Supply Functions under Technology Licensing

We consider an infinitely-lived duopoly with asymmetric costs and study the incentives of the firms to collude or compete in supply functions under the possibility of technology licensing. Simulating the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of alternative industry organizations, we show that licensing makes collusion harder; but it always has a positive effect on the welfares of consumers and the less efficient firm in the duopoly.

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Year of publication:	2021-04-19
Authors:	Celen, Ihsan ; Saglam, Ismail

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Celen, Ihsan and Saglam, Ismail (2021): Collusion in Supply Functions under Technology Licensing.
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; O30 - Technological Change; Research and Development. General
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015240428