Collusion, Renegotiation and Implementation

We study the implementation problem for exchange economies when agents can renegotiate the outcome assigned by the planner and can collude. We focus on the use of sequential mechanisms and present a simple sufficient condition for implementation with renegotiation in strong perfect equilibrium. We present an application to optimal risk sharing, showing that the possibility of collusion and renegotiation does not in general prevent the implementation of efficient allocations

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Baliga, Sandeep ; Brusco, Sandro
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Kooperation \| Cooperation \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 17, Iss. 1, 2000 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175862