COLLUSION VIA RESALE
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction interbidderresale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, withpositive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition anddivides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders. Theseequilibria interim Pareto dominate (among bidders) the standard value-biddingequilibrium, without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on biddingbehavior or post-bidding spoil-division.[...]
Year of publication: |
2007-06-30
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Authors: | Garratt, Rodney J. ; Tröger, Thomas ; Zheng, Charles Z. |
Institutions: | Iowa State University of Science and Technology <Ames, Iowa> / Department of Economics |
Subject: | Preis | Abgestimmtes Verhalten | Collusion | Wiederverkauf | resale | Phänomen | sunspots |
Saved in:
Extent: | 410624 bytes 47 p. application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Classification: | Strategic management ; Specific management methods ; Business operations of other services ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification |
Source: | USB Cologne (business full texts) |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360823