Combination of real options and game-theoretic approach in investment analysis

Investments in technology create a large amount of capital investments by major companies. Assessing such investment projects is identified as critical to the efficient assignment of resources. Viewing investment projects as real options, this paper expands a method for assessing technology investment decisions in the linkage existence of uncertainty and competition. It combines the game-theoretic models of strategic market interactions with a real options approach. Several key characteristics underlie the model. First, our study shows how investment strategies rely on competitive interactions. Under the force of competition, firms hurry to exercise their options early. The resulting ''hurry equilibrium'' destroys the option value of waiting and involves violent investment behavior. Second, we get best investment policies and critical investment entrances. This suggests that integrating will be unavoidable in some information product markets. The model creates some new intuitions into the forces that shape market behavior as noticed in the information technology industry. It can be used to specify best investment policies for technology innovations and adoptions, multistage R&D, and investment projects in information technology.