Commerce et préférences.. Les effets d'une clause démocratique

For several years, preferential trade agreements have been oriented towards initiating a deep integration process including a ?democratic? clause. We can consider the inclusion of such a clause as a political choice to promote democracy. However, it can also be viewed as a pre-condition for implementing an institutional ?deep integration? process, which might also raise new costs impeding trade. The aim of this paper is to verify that preferential trade agreements (ptas) have a higher positive effect on trade inside the area when they are bound by a democratic constraint. To achieve this, we use an Anderson and van Wincoop [2003] type of gravity model, and we differentiate between ptas according to whether they include a democratic clause or not. Empirical evidence shows that the inclusion of a democratic clause has a negative effect on bilateral trade so long as at least one northern country is concerned. Classification JEL : F13, F15, O19 ; P16