Commitment in first-price auctions
Year of publication: |
August 2018
|
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Authors: | Xu, Yunjian ; Ligett, Katrina |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 66.2018, 2, p. 449-489
|
Subject: | First-price auction | Commitment | Stackelberg game | Collusion | Subgame perfect equilibrium | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Duopol | Duopoly | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
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