Commitment versus flexibility in enforcement games

Shmuel Leshem; Avraham D. Tabbach

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Leshem, Shmuel ; Tabbach, Avraham D.
Subject:	Rechtsdurchsetzung \| Law enforcement \| Komplementärgüter \| Complementary goods \| Substitutionseffekt \| Substitution effect \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

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