Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Emanuele Gerratana; Levent Koçkesen
| Year of publication: |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Gerratana, Emanuele ; Koçkesen, Levent |
| Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 19.2015, 3, p. 173-209
|
| Subject: | Third-party contracts | Commitment | Strategic delegation | Renegotiation | Asymmetric information | Renegotiation-proofness | Entry-deterrence | Asymmetrische Information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Vertrag | Contract | Reputation | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409065