Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gerratana, Emanuele ; Koçkesen, Levent |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 19.2015, 3, p. 173-209
|
Subject: | Third-party contracts | Commitment | Strategic delegation | Renegotiation | Asymmetric information | Renegotiation-proofness | Entry-deterrence | Asymmetrische Information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Vertrag | Contract | Reputation | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
-
Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Gerratana, Emanuele, (2013)
-
Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
Evans, Robert, (2015)
-
Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts
Gerratana, Emanuele, (2008)
- More ...
-
Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts
Gerratana, Emanuele, (2009)
-
Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Gerratana, Emanuele, (2013)
-
Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
Gerratana, Emanuele, (2012)
- More ...