Common Knowledge and Disparate Priors: When it is O.K. to Agree to Disagree
Year of publication: |
2007-05-15
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hellman, Ziv |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
---|---|
Language: | English |
Notes: | Hellman, Ziv (2007): Common Knowledge and Disparate Priors: When it is O.K. to Agree to Disagree. |
Classification: | D84 - Expectations; Speculations ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | BASE |
-
Speculative Trade under Unawareness: The Infinite Case
Meier, Martin, (2010)
-
Game theory on strategic communication: an approach from Thomas S. Schelling
Estrada, Fernando, (2010)
-
Fragments on black swan: money, credit and finance in The Arcades Project of Walter Benjamin
Estrada, Fernando, (2010)
- More ...
-
Iterated Expectations, Compact Spaces and Common Priors
Hellman, Ziv, (2007)
-
Iterated Expectations, Compact Spaces and Common Priors
Hellman, Ziv, (2007)
-
Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games
Hellman, Ziv, (2008)
- More ...