Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas : experimental evidence

Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni

Social norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner's dilemma. The interaction was repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly commit to actions.

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Year of publication:	[2011]
Authors:	Camera, Gabriele ; Casari, Marco ; Bigoni, Maria
Publisher:	Bologna, Italy : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics
Subject:	coordination \| cheap-talk \| deception \| indefinitely repeated game \| social norms \| Soziale Norm \| Social norm \| Experiment \| Kommunikation \| Communication \| Gefangenendilemma \| Prisoner's dilemma \| Kooperation \| Cooperation \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Koordination \| Coordination \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

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