Communication games with optional verification
Year of publication: |
[2018]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schopohl, Simon |
Publisher: |
[Louvain-la-Neuve] : CORE |
Subject: | cheap-talk | communication | costly disclosure | full revelation | Sender-Receiver game | verifiable information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kommunikation | Communication | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Signalling |
-
Communication games with optional verification
Schopohl, Simon, (2016)
-
Full revelation under optional verification
Schopohl, Simon, (2019)
-
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Meyer, Margaret A., (2019)
- More ...
-
Information Transmission in Hierarchies
Schopohl, Simon, (2017)
-
Communication games with optional verification
Schopohl, Simon, (2016)
-
Key Players in Bullying Networks
Atay, Ata, (2022)
- More ...