Comparing Quality Signals : Are Warranties Better than Advertisements to Promote Higher Product Quality?

Firms use different instruments to convey product quality in order to counteract market failures due to lack of information on behalf of consumers. We will give a brief overview on the two main types of quality signals. Then an economic model is developed to determine which offers higher incentives to provide incentives for higher production quality. The results are applied to the present legislation on warranty law and on misleading advertisement

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Noll, Juergen
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Produktqualität \| Product quality \| Werbung \| Advertising \| Theorie \| Theory \| Garantie \| Warranty

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (18 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 2002 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.320860 [DOI]
Classification:	M37 - Advertising ; K12 - Contract Law ; D18 - Consumer Protection ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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