Competing mechanism games of moral hazard : communication and robustness
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Attardi, Andrea ; Campioni, Eloisa ; Piaser, Gwenae͏̈l ; Rajan, Uday |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 16.2012, 4, p. 283-296
|
Subject: | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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