Competition and corporate control in partial ownership acquisitions

Competition authorities have a growing interest in assessing the effects of partial ownership arrangements. We show that the effects of such agreements on competition and welfare depend on the intensity of competition in the market and on the firms' governance structure. When assessing the effects of partial ownership, competition policy has to consider both the financial interest and level of control of the acquiring firm in the target firm.

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Stühmeier, Torben
Publisher:	Düsseldorf : Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Subject:	corporate control \| merger \| partial acquisition

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Series:	DICE Discussion Paper ; 211
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	978-3-86304-210-3
Other identifiers:	847771997 [GVK] hdl:10419/127570 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:dicedp:211 [RePEc]
Classification:	L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011429090