Competition and dynamics of takeover contests

This paper investigates the effect of potential competition on takeovers which we model as a bargaining game with alternating offers where calling an auction represents an outside option for each bidder at each stage of the game. The model describes a takeover process that is initiated by an unsolicited bidder, and it aims to answer three main questions: who wins the takeover and how? when? and how much is the takeover premium?

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Calcagno, Riccardo ; Falconieri, Sonia
Published in:	Journal of Corporate Finance. - Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199. - Vol. 26.2014, C, p. 36-56
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Takeover negotiations \| Auctions \| Bargaining \| Outside option

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776955