Competitive Externalities in Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand

This paper analyzes equilibria in sequential take-it-or-leave-it sales when demand is stochastic. It is shown that equilibria in this sales mechanism, unlike in sequential auctions, trade-off allocative efficiency and competing buyers' opportunities to acquire an item to be sold, permitting prices and expected revenue above those of one-shot offers. Hence Coase-type conjectures are invalid in this setting.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Beckert, Walter
Published in:	Topics in Theoretical Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1534-598X, ZDB-ID 2040053-6. - Vol. 6.2006, 1
Publisher:	De Gruyter
Subject:	dynamic monopoly \| stochastic demand \| Coase conjecture

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	research-article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2202/1534-598X.1330 [DOI]
Source:	Other ZBW resources

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014589090