Complementary Teams, Linear Sharing Rules and Uncertainty.

Two recent articles, Legros & Matthews (1993) and Vislie (1994), show that in a non-cooperative production game with stricly complementary (non-observable) inputs, interpretd as effort levels, there exists a linear budget-balancing sharing rule that implements the efficient effort vector in Nash strategies. In this note we test the linear implementability result for robustness.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Krogh Hvide, H
Institutions:	Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH)
Subject:	GAMES \| UNCERTAINTY \| DECISION MAKING

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Series:	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	6 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005672044