Complicity without connection or communication

Abigail Barr and Georgia Michailidou

We use a novel experiment to investigate whether people aim to coordinate when, to do so, they have to lie; and are more willing to lie when, in doing so, they are aiming to coordinate with a potential accomplice, i.e., another with whom coordination would be beneficial and who is facing the same individual and mutual incentives and the same moral dilemma. We find that people often aim to coordinate when they have to lie to do so and that having a potential accomplice increases willingness to lie even when that potential accomplice is a stranger and communication is not possible.

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Year of publication:	September 2016
Authors:	Barr, Abigail ; Michailidou, Georgia
Publisher:	Nottingham : CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics
Subject:	complicity \| lying \| coordination \| die rolling task \| Kommunikation \| Communication \| Koordination \| Coordination \| Interne Kommunikation \| Internal communication