Computational Complexity in the Design of Voting Systems

This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting systems, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We point out that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Takamiya, Koji ; Tanaka, Akira
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wahlsystem \| Electoral system
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	Osaka University Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper ; No. 653
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2, 2006 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059113