Condorcet Jury Theorem : an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
Johanna M. M. Goertz; François Maniquet
| Year of publication: |
2014
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Goertz, Johanna M. M. ; Maniquet, François |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 125.2014, 1, p. 25-28
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| Subject: | Condorcet Jury Theorem | Information aggregation | Large Poisson games | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Information | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Aggregation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504787