Constitutional tax constraints within a classical model of Leviathan
Year of publication: |
1984
|
---|---|
Authors: | Toma, Eugenia Froedge ; Toma, Mark |
Published in: |
History of Political Economy. - Duke University Press. - Vol. 16.1984, 1, p. 89-107
|
Publisher: |
Duke University Press |
Subject: | constitutional tax | classicism | Leviathan |
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