Constrained discretion and central bank transparency
Year of publication: |
March 2018
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Authors: | Bianchi, Francesco ; Melosi, Leonardo |
Published in: |
The review of economics and statistics. - Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ISSN 0034-6535, ZDB-ID 207962-8. - Vol. 100.2018, 1, p. 187-202
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Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Politische Kommunikation | Political communication | Reputation | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Inflationserwartung | Inflation expectations | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Inflationsbekämpfung | Anti-inflation policy | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States | 1954-2008 |
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