Constrained Efficiency

I define constrained efficient direct mechanisms as those that are not Pareto dominated within the set of direct mechanisms that satisfy some given feasibility constraints – incentive compatibility and other constraints. I show a standard equivalence with maximization of a social welfare functional. I illustrate the definition with two examples, public good provision and assignment problem, where I construct constrained efficient direct mechanisms

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Year of publication:	[2023]
Authors:	Copic, Jernej
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Effizienz \| Efficiency \| Technische Effizienz \| Technical efficiency \| Unvollkommener Markt \| Incomplete market

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (39 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 18, 2020 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4390940 [DOI]
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014355860