Constrained interactions and social coordination : conference paper

Staudigl, Mathias; Weidenholzer, Simon

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their linking choice. The main reason behind this result is that under constrained interactions agents face a trade-off between the links they have and those they would rather have.

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Year of publication:	2013 ; This version: May 2012
Authors:	Staudigl, Mathias ; Weidenholzer, Simon
Published in:	Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung Session: Evolution of networks and games ; V
Publisher:	[Kiel : ZBW
Subject:	Coordination Games \| Equilibrium Selection \| Learning \| Network Formation \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Koordination \| Coordination \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Netzwerk \| Network \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model \| Soziale Beziehungen \| Social relations