Consumer myopia, competition and the incentives to unshroud add-on information

Tobias Wenzel

This paper studies unshrouding decisions in a framework similar to Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but considers an alternative unshrouding mechanism where the impact of advertising add-on information depends on the number of unshrouding firms. We show that shrouding becomes less prevalent as the number of competing firms increases. With unshrouding costs a non-monotonic relationship between the number of firms and unshrouding may arise.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Wenzel, Tobias
Publisher:	Düsseldorf : DICE
Subject:	Bounded rationality \| Add-on pricing \| Shrouding \| Begrenzte Rationalität \| Konsumentenverhalten \| Consumer behaviour \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Preismanagement \| Pricing strategy \| Preiswettbewerb \| Price competition

Extent:	Online-Ressource (19 S.)
Series:	DICE discussion paper. - Düsseldorf, Germany : düsseldorf university press, ISSN 2190-9938, ZDB-ID 2578649-0. - Vol. 126
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
ISBN:	978-3-86304-125-0
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/88627 [Handle]
Classification:	D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; L10 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223577