Contests with Random Noise and a Shared Prize

This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981). Similar to results in Lazear and Rosen, as the level of noise decreases the equilibrium effort rises. As the noise variance approaches zero, the equilibrium effort of the shared-prize contest approaches that of a Tullock lottery contest.

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Year of publication:	2009-05
Authors:	Sheremeta, Roman ; Masters, William ; Cason, Timothy
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Contests \| All-pay auctions \| Tournaments \| Random noise \| Shared prize

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108366