Contests with Random Noise and a Shared Prize

This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981). Similar to results in Lazear and Rosen, as the level of noise decreases the equilibrium effort rises. As the noise variance approaches zero, the equilibrium effort of the shared-prize contest approaches that of a Tullock lottery contest.

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Year of publication:	2009-05
Authors:	Sheremeta, Roman ; Masters, William ; Cason, Timothy

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Sheremeta, Roman and Masters, William and Cason, Timothy (2009): Contests with Random Noise and a Shared Prize.
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	BASE

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