Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

In this paper we consider a number of different ways that a sequence of discrete-time repeated games can approach a continuous-time limit. Our purpose is to clarify the effects of three different factors: 1) The distribution of signals in a fixed discrete-time game, 2) How the distribution (and notably its variance) changes with the period length, and 3) whether some of the player roles are filled by sequences of short-run players

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Year of publication:	2006-12-03
Authors:	Fudenberg, Drew ; Levine, David K.
Institutions:	Society for Economic Dynamics - SED
Subject:	game theory \| repeated games

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Series:	2006 Meeting Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 2006 Meeting Papers Number 680
Classification:	A1 - General Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977938