Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information.

This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues, such as the appropriate game form, existence, and uniqueness of equilibria, are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework.

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Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	MacLeod, W. Bentley ; Malcomson, James M.
Published in:	Canadian Journal of Economics. - Canadian Economics Association - CEA. - Vol. 28.1995, 2, p. 336-67
Publisher:	Canadian Economics Association - CEA

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Published
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005467051