Contract design and performance of railway maintenance : effects of incentive intensity and performance incentive schemes
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Odolinski, Kristofer |
Published in: |
Economics of transportation : the official journal of the International Transportation Economics Association. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 2212-0122, ZDB-ID 2708609-4. - Vol. 18.2019, p. 50-59
|
Subject: | Contract design | Incentive intensity | Infrastructure | Maintenance | Rail | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Instandhaltung | Maintenance policy | Anreiz | Incentives | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Infrastrukturinvestition | Infrastructure investment |
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