Contract-intensive money : contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Clague, Christopher K. ; Keefer, Philip ; Knack, Stephen F. ; Olson, Mancur |
Published in: |
Democracy, governance, and growth. - Ann Arbor, Mich. : Univ. of Michigan Press, ISBN 0-472-09823-3. - 2003, p. 78-109
|
Subject: | Vertrag | Contract | Sachenrecht | Law of property | Wirtschaftswachstum | Economic growth | Investition | Investment | Währung | Currency | Geld | Money | Gambia | Iran | Chile | Brasilien | Brazil | Grenada | Türkei | Turkey | Indonesien | Indonesia | 1960-1989 |
-
Contract-intensive money : contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance
Clague, Christopher K., (1999)
-
Good-bye original sin, hello risk on-off, financial fragility, and crises?
Aizenman, Joshua, (2020)
-
Why don't poor countries catch up? : A cross-national test of an institutional explanation
Keefer, Philip, (1997)
- More ...
-
Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies
Clague, Christopher K., (2003)
-
Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies
Clague, Christopher K., (1996)
-
Dissent in economics : the convergence of extremes
Olson, Mancur, (1976)
- More ...