Contracting over persistent information
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Zhao, Wei ; Mezzetti, Claudio ; Renou, Ludovic ; Tomala, Tristan |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 19.2024, 2, p. 917-974
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Subject: | persuasion | contract | disclosure | Dynamic | information | receiver | revelation | sender | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE5056 [DOI] |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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