Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle : the single agent case
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bester, Helmut ; Strausz, Roland |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 69.2001, 4, p. 1077-1098
|
Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
-
Delegation and information revelation
Gautier, Axel, (2000)
-
Participation constraints in adverse selection models
Jullien, Bruno, (2000)
-
Delegation and information revelation
Gautier, Axel, (2000)
- More ...
-
Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication
Bester, Helmut, (2003)
-
Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle
Bester, Helmut,
-
Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication
Bester, Helmut,
- More ...