Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Bester, Helmut ; Strausz, Roland |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Verlagsorte], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798x. - Vol. 69.2001, 4, p. 1077-1098
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