Contracts renegotiation in a Continuous State Space.

In this paper I demonstrate the existence an initial incomplete contract that can subsequently be renegociated to the set of first best allocations in a fairly geneal principal-agent model when the state space is continuous.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Nosal, E.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Waterloo
Subject:	CONTRACTS \| ECONOMIC MODELS \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	25 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005225378