Contracts versus salaries in matching : comment

Jan Christoph Schlegel

In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (Amer. Econ. Rev. 102(1): 594-601, 2012) to show that under the assumption of unilaterally substitutable preferences a matching market with contracts may be embedded into a matching market with salaries. In particular, my result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet-to-branch matching.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Schlegel, Jan Christoph
Other Persons:	Echenique, Federico (contributor)
Publisher:	Lausanne : Univ. de Lausanne, DEEP
Subject:	Matching \| Matching with contracts \| Matching with salaries \| Embedding \| Substitutes \| Unilateral substitutes \| Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes \| Collective bargaining theory \| Tarifvertrag \| Collective agreement \| Theorie \| Theory

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Contracts versus salaries in matching, 2012

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