Contractual remedies to the holdup problem : a dynamic perspective
Year of publication: |
Feb. 2004 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
|
---|---|
Other Persons: | Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor) ; Sákovics, József (contributor) |
Institutions: | Social Systems Research Institute (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Madison : SSRI |
Subject: | specificity | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Investitionsrisiko | Investment risk |
-
Market-induced asset specificity : redefining the hold-up problem
Lewin-Solomons, Shira B., (2003)
-
Contracts, investment incentives, and efficiency in the restructured electricity market
Onofri, Laura, (2003)
-
Incentives in contracts for public sector projects with private sector participation
Reside, Renato E., (2003)
- More ...
-
Che, Yeon-Koo, (2001)
-
'Know thy enemies' : knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions
Che, Yeon-Koo, (2001)
-
Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms
Che, Yeon-Koo, (2004)
- More ...