Contractual revisions in compensation : evidence from merger bonuses to target CEOs
Year of publication: |
April/May 2016
|
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Authors: | Fich, Eliezer M. ; Rice, Edward M. ; Anh L. Tran |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 61.2016, 2/3, p. 338-368
|
Subject: | Merger bonus | Acquisitions | Synergies | Wealth transfer | Abnormal accruals | SEC enforcement action | Fusion | Merger | Übernahme | Takeover | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Fusionskontrolle | Merger control | Synergie | Synergy | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Ankündigungseffekt | Announcement effect | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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