Cooperation and subgame perfect equilibria in global pollution problems with critical threshold
Year of publication: |
June 2018
|
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Authors: | Bahel, Eric |
Published in: |
Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 70.2018, 2, p. 457-481
|
Subject: | Asymmetry | cooperation | Global pollution | Markov perfect equilibrium | Transfers | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Umweltbelastung | Pollution | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory |
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