Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels

by Jörg Oechssler

It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.

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Year of publication:	February 2001
Authors:	Oechssler, Joerg
Publisher:	Bonn : Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bonn
Subject:	cooperation \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Lernpsychologie \| Learning psychology \| Gefangenendilemma \| Prisoner's dilemma \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Theorie \| Theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 9 Seiten)
Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers / BGSE. - Bonn : Univ., ZDB-ID 2124986-6. - Vol. 2001, 8
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/78416 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539809