Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominance-solvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Potters, Johannes (Jan) J. M. ; Suetens, Sigrid
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Experiment \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition

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