Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominancesolvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium.We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Potters, Jan ; Suetens, Sigrid
Institutions:	Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Subject:	experiments \| cooperation \| strategic substitutes and complements \| externalities

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series CentER Discussion Paper Number 2006-48
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C9 - Design of Experiments ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092089